Analysis of the influence of the transfer of pricing right on decisions of recycling and remanufacturing

Journal Information

J. Hefei Univ. Tech. (Nat. Sci.), Jul.2024, Vol.47 No.7: 962-966, 994

DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-5060.2024.07.016

Authors

HUANG Mengyu $ ^{1} $, LI Kai $ ^{1,2} $, FU Hong $ ^{1,2} $

(1. School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China; 2. Key Laboratory of Process Optimization and Intelligent Decision Making of Ministry of Education, Hefei 230009, China)

Abstract and Keywords

Abstract: In order to explore the changes in corporate decisions when the pricing right for transfer price is transferred from the manufacturer to the recycler, in view of the two situations of whether the recycler has the pricing right for transfer price, and considering recycling competition and competition between new and remanufactured products, the variation laws of recycling price, new product output, and remanufactured product output in equilibrium are analyzed using symmetric game theory. The study found that when the manufacturer has the pricing right for transfer price, the transfer price, recycling price, and outputs in equilibrium all have a monotone linear relationship with the price of new parts (returns from the processing of recycled parts). When the recycler has the pricing right for transfer price, the transfer price and the manufacturer's recycling price in equilibrium have nothing to do with the price of new parts, but are negatively related to the returns from the processing of recycled parts. When consumers clearly prefer the manufacturer's recycling channel, compared to the manufacturer with pricing right, the third-party recycler with the pricing right for transfer price can effectively cut down the equilibrium transfer price, which is more beneficial to the manufacturer.

Keywords: remanufacturing output competition; recycling price; transfer price; third-party recycler; symmetric game

作者信息

黄梦雨 $ ^{1} $，李凯 $ ^{1,2} $，付红 $ ^{1,2} $

(1. 合肥工业大学管理学院，安徽合肥 230009；2. 过程优化与智能决策教育部重点实验室，安徽合肥 230009)

摘要和关键词

摘要: 为探讨转移价格的定价权从制造商—方向回收商—方转移时企业决策的变化,文章从回收商是否具有转移价格定价权的2种情形出发,考虑回收竞争以及新产品与再制造产品的竞争,通过对称博弈得到均衡状态下回收价格、新产品产量以及再制造产品产量的变化规律。研究表明:制造商拥有转移价格定价权时,均衡状态下的转移价格、回收价格以及产量决策与新零部件价格(回收零部件的处理收益)均呈单调线性关系;回收商拥有转移价格定价权时,均衡的转移价格和制造商回收价格决策与新零部件价格无关、与回收零部件的处理收益呈负相关;消费者显著偏好制造商回收渠道时,与制造商具有定价权相比,第三方回收商具有转移价格的决策权能够有效降低均衡的转移价格,对制造商更有利。

关键词: 再制造产量竞争；回收定价；转移价格；第三方回收商；对称博弈

Funding

国家自然科学基金资助项目（71871076；72271070）；安徽省自然科学基金杰青资助项目（2208085J07）

合肥工业大学学报(自然科学版)

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