Abstract: This paper considers the supply chain structure composed of a marketing pharmaceutical enterprise and a drug procurement platform, constructs a game model for the pharmaceutical enterprise under direct procurement and volume-based procurement, respectively, analyzes the optimal strategy selection of the pharmaceutical enterprise, and explores the influence of factors such as the proportion of agreed procurement, marketing effort coefficient, and marketing cost coefficient on relevant decisions of the pharmaceutical enterprise. The results show that when the proportion of agreed procurement is small and the negotiation ability of the enterprise is strong, the choice to participate in the volume-based procurement becomes the dominant strategy for the pharmaceutical enterprise. On the contrary, when the proportion of agreed procurement is large, direct procurement can yield higher profits for the pharmaceutical enterprise. With the increase of the enterprise's negotiation ability and demand influence coefficient of marketing level, the decision range for the enterprise to participate in volume-based procurement increases.
Keywords: volume-based procurement; Nash bargaining; enterprise strategic decision
合肥工业大学学报自科版