内创业情境下基于用户需求个性化程度的平台企业决策权配置

文章研究内创业情境下平台企业在面向不同个性化程度的用户需求时的决策权科学下放问题, 建立以用户效用为目标函数的模型, 探讨决策权配置对小微单元产品或服务的价格和需求量的影响, 并从收益角度分析了平台企业下放决策权的合适程度。结果表明: 若用户需求个性化程度较低, 则适当甚至过多的决策权下放均可以带来一定的收益; 相反, 若用户需求个性化程度较高, 则平台企业只能适度下放决策权, 集权或过多的下放决策权会给企业绩效带来负面影响。此外在内创业情境下, 企业市场开发逻辑需要依据用户需求个性化程度的差异进行相应的调整。

This paper studies how platform enterprises can scientifically delegate decision-making power when addressing user demands with varying degrees of personalization in the context of intrapreneurship. By establishing a model with the user utility as the objective function, the paper discusses the impact of the allocation of decision-making power on the price and demand of small and micro products or services, and analyzes the appropriateness of platform enterprises to delegate decision-making power from the perspective of revenue. The results show that if the degree of personalization of user demands is low, appropriate or even excessive decentralization of decision-making power can bring some benefits. On the contrary, if the user demands are highly personalized, platform enterprises should appropriately delegate decision-making power. Centralization or excessive decentralization of decision-making power will have a negative impact on enterprise performance. The model conclusion also suggests that the market development logic of enterprises in the context of intrapreneurship needs to be adjusted according to the differences in users' personalized demands.