捆绑销售供应链定价和质量控制策略研究

文章以单供应商、单零售商生产销售畅销品和滞销品供应链为研究对象, 在考虑市场需求依赖零售商定价和供应商质量控制努力前提下, 分别建立单独销售和捆绑销售下的供应商占主导、零售商占主导的Stackelberg博弈模型, 推导出各模型下零售商的最优定价、供应商的最优质量控制策略。通过比较分析2种博弈模型下的供应链成员的策略和利润, 得出如下结论: 与供应商占主导相比, 当零售商占主导时, 无论是单独销售还是捆绑销售, 零售商都会对滞销品制定较高的零售价格, 供应商都会对滞销品投入较多的质量控制努力费用; 在单独销售情形下, 零售商对畅销品制定较高的零售价格, 供应商对畅销品投入较多的质量控制努力费用; 在捆绑销售情形下, 结果恰好相反, 零售商对畅销品制定较低的零售价格, 供应商对畅销品投入较少的质量控制努力费用。无论是单独销售还是捆绑销售, 供应商和零售商都在各自占主导时获得最大利润, 也即序贯博弈中先动优势可以带来更多收益; 但对供应链整体来说, 零售商占主导的Stackelberg博弈是供应链双方的最佳选择。

In this paper, a two-tier supply chain with one supplier and one retailer for selling the un-marketable goods and the fast-selling goods is studied. Under the assumption that the market demand depends on the retailer's pricing and the supplier's quality control efforts, the game models of the independent sales and bundling sales are developed under manufacturer-dominated Stackelberg game and retailer-dominated Stackelberg game respectively. The optimal retailer's selling prices and supplier's quality control policies of each model are derived. By comparing the policies and profits of the supply chain members under two game models, the following conclusions are drawn: if the retailer is the leader in the Stackelberg game, whether the products are sold separately or bundled together, the retailer will set a higher price and the supplier will invest more money in the quality control for the un-marketable goods; if the retailer is the leader in the Stackelberg game, when the products are sold separately, the retailer will set a higher price and the supplier will invest more money in the quality control for the fast-selling goods, whereas when the products are sold bundled together, the retailer will set a lower price and the supplier will invest less money in the quality control for the fast-selling goods. Whether the products are sold separately or bundled together, both manufacturer and retailer get maximum profit when they each take the lead, i.e., the first-mover advantage in a sequential